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IN WASHINGTON STATE, OPEN COURTS 
JURISPRUDENCE CONSISTS MAINLY OF OPEN 
QUESTIONS 
Anne L. Ellington* and Jeanine Blackett Lutzenhiser** 
Abstract: Issues of public trial and the open administration of justice have been an intense 
focus of the Washington State Supreme Court in recent years. In its December issue, the 
Washington Law Review surveyed U.S. and Washington State public trial and public access 
jurisprudence, and made recommendations for clarifying the constitutional issues involved 
when a courtroom “closure” occurs. Just before that issue went to press, the Washington 
State Supreme Court decided four important public trial cases: State v. Sublett, State v. Wise, 
State v. Paumier, and In re Morris. The court issued fourteen separate opinions, clearly 
demonstrating deep divisions among the justices. This follow-up article examines the 
principal arguments of the new opinions, identifies what areas appear settled, and discusses 
the important questions that remain unresolved. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patrick Morris was convicted of sex crimes against his daughter.1 
Michael Sublett went to prison for premeditated murder.2 Both Eric 
                                                     
1. In re Morris, 176 Wash. 2d 157, 161, 288 P.3d 1140, 1142 (2012). 
2. State v. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d 58, 65, 292 P.3d 715, 718 (2012). 
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Wise and Rene Paumier were convicted of burglary.3 What do these 
defendants have in common? At some point during their trials, a 
procedure was conducted in chambers instead of the public courtroom, 
thereby implicating both the constitutional right of each defendant to a 
public trial and the constitutional right of the public to the open 
administration of justice. In each case, the procedures were routine, 
longstanding practices, and the defendants made no objection. Each 
challenged the practice for the first time on appeal. 
On November 21, 2012, the Washington State Supreme Court 
announced its decisions in these four cases. Of the four defendants, only 
Sublett’s conviction was affirmed. In the other three cases, the Court 
reversed for violation of the defendant’s public trial right and ordered 
new trials. 
The four decisions comprise fourteen separate opinions. Only two 
cases garnered a majority (both 5-4); in the others, a lead opinion was 
accompanied by either three separate concurrences or one concurrence 
and two separate dissents. 
In its December issue (which went to press the week the four 
decisions were released), the Washington Law Review surveyed U.S. and 
Washington State public trial and public access jurisprudence (including 
three of these four cases at the intermediate appellate court level), and 
made recommendations for clarifying the constitutional and prudential 
issues involved.4 This article examines whether the new decisions have 
clarified the analytical approach, concludes they have not, and attempts 
to identify the areas in which the law is settled and the issues the Court 
has yet to resolve. Because these include the proper analytical 
framework for both trial and review, and involve issues that may arise in 
any criminal case, consensus as to the correct approach will greatly 
contribute to the interests of justice. 
Part I summarizes the constitutional rights implicated by exclusion of 
the public from court proceedings. Part II recaps the course of 
Washington public trial and open access jurisprudence. Part III analyzes 
the different opinions in the four recent cases, and highlights the 
persistent (and so far intractable) disagreements among the justices. Part 
IV identifies the areas in which agreement is most urgently needed so 
that trial courts are able to safeguard the important constitutional 
interests at issue. 
                                                     
3. State v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d 1, 6, 288 P.3d 1113, 1115 (2012); State v. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d 
29, 32, 288 P.3d 1126, 1128 (2012). 
4. Jeanine Blackett Lutzenhiser, Comment, An Open Courts Checklist: Clarifying Washington’s 
Public Trial and Public Access Jurisprudence, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1203 (2012). 
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I.  THE U.S. AND WASHINGTON CONSTITUTIONS 
GUARANTEE BOTH THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO 
PUBLIC TRIAL AND THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO OPEN 
ACCESS 
When a Washington State judge excludes members of the public from 
court proceedings, or seals records related to a case, the exclusion 
implicates state and federal constitutional rights of the public and, in 
criminal cases, of the defendants. 
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 
22 of the Washington Constitution contain nearly identical provisions 
guaranteeing the right of an accused to a public trial.5 The First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is generally understood to 
guarantee open access for the public and press to judicial proceedings.6 
The freedoms enumerated in the First Amendment—of speech, the 
press, the right of assembly, and the right to petition the government—
”share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication 
on matters relating to the functioning of government.”7 Article I, section 
10 of the Washington Constitution also contains a separate guarantee of 
the open administration of justice: “Justice in all cases shall be 
administered openly, and without unnecessary delay.”8 This special 
emphasis on the presumption of open court proceedings renders the 
Washington Constitution at least arguably more stringent on this point, 
and the Washington State Supreme Court’s decisions have consistently 
emphasized the value of open administration of justice.9 
                                                     
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 (“In criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person, or by counsel . . . to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have 
been committed and the right to appeal in all cases . . . .”). 
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”). For a discussion of the open-access guarantees flowing from the First 
Amendment, see Lutzenhiser, supra note 4, at 1207–08.  
7. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980). 
8. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
9. See, e.g., State v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d 1, 5, 288 P.3d 1113, 1115 (2012); State v. Lormor, 172 
Wash. 2d 85, 90–91, 257 P.3d 624, 627–28 (2011); In re Detention of D.F.F., 172 Wash. 2d 37, 39–
40, 256 P.3d 357, 359–60 (2011); State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 229–30; 217 P.3d 310, 315–16 
(2009); State v. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d 140, 147–48, 217 P.3d 321, 324–25 (2009); State v. 
Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d 167, 179, 137 P.3d 825, 830–31 (2006); Rufer v. Abbott Labs., 154 Wash. 
2d 530, 540, 114 P.3d 1182, 1186–87 (2005); In re Orange, 152 Wash. 2d 795, 804–05, 100 P.3d 
291, 295–96 (2005); Dreiling v. Jain, 151 Wash. 2d 900, 903–04, 93 P.3d 861, 864 (2004); State v. 
Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d 254, 258, 906 P.2d 325, 327 (1995); Allied Daily Newspapers of 
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Under both constitutions, “the public’s right of access is not absolute, 
and may be limited to protect other interests.”10 In several important 
cases involving challenges brought by the media, the Washington State 
Supreme Court defined the public’s right to open proceedings under 
article I, section 10. In Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa11 and Allied Daily 
Newspapers v. Eikenberry,12 the Court announced the test to be used to 
balance the public’s right to access against other compelling interests.13 
In more recent years, the Court has addressed numerous cases 
involving the defendant’s right to a public trial under article I, section 
22. Actions challenged as unconstitutional closures (exclusion of the 
public) have ranged from the total clearing of the courtroom for all or 
part of pretrial proceedings or trial;14 the exclusion of particular 
members of the public;15 the private questioning of prospective jurors in 
the judge’s chambers;16 and even the bailiff’s release, for reasons of 
illness, of two members of the jury venire before voir dire even began.17 
Issues at the core of these recent closure cases include the scope of 
the defendant’s public trial right (i.e., to what proceedings does the right 
attach) and the proper analysis for deciding when closure is justified (i.e. 
how to balance the defendant’s right to open trial, the public’s right to 
open proceedings, and other compelling interests arguably justifying 
closure—which may include the defendant’s right to a fair trial).18 On 
                                                     
Washington v. Eikenberry, 121 Wash. 2d 205, 209–10, 848 P.2d 1258, 1260–61 (1993); Seattle 
Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d 30, 36, 640 P.2d 716, 719 (1982); Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 59–60, 615 P.2d 440, 444–45 (1980). 
10. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 36, 640 P.2d at 719.  
11. 97 Wash. 2d 30, 640 P.2d 716. 
12. 121 Wash. 2d 205, 848 P.2d 1258. 
13. See Eikenberry, 121 Wash. 2d at 209–11, 848 P.2d at 1260–61; Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 37–
39, 640 P.2d at 720–21. This test parallels the test for evaluating courtroom closures. See infra Part 
II. 
14. See, e.g., Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d at 177, 137 P.3d at 830; State v. Brightman, 155 Wash. 2d 
506, 509, 122 P.3d 150, 151 (2005); Orange, 152 Wash. 2d at 799, 100 P.3d at 293; Bone-Club, 128 
Wash. 2d at 256, 906 P.2d at 326. 
15. State v. Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d 85, 257 P.3d 624 (2011). 
16. See, e.g., State v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d 1, 288 P.3d 1113 (2012); State v. Paumier, 176 Wash. 
2d 29, 288 P.3d 1126 (2012); State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 217 P.3d 310 (2009); State v. 
Momah, 167 Wash. 2d 140, 217 P.3d 321 (2009). 
17. State v. Wilson, __ Wash. App. __, 298 P.3d 148, 150–51 (2013).  
18. See, e.g., Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d at 90–91, 257 P.3d at 627–28; In re Detention of D.F.F., 172 
Wash. 2d 37, 39–40, 256 P.3d 357, 359–60 (2011); Strode, 167 Wash. 2d at 229–30, 217 P.3d at 
315–16; Momah, 167 Wash. 2d at 147–48, 217 P.3d at 324–25; Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d at 179, 
137 P.3d at 830–31; Rufer v. Abbott Labs., 154 Wash. 2d 530, 540, 114 P.3d 1182, 1186–87 
(2005); Orange, 152 Wash. 2d at 804–05, 100 P.3d at 295–96; Dreiling v. Jain, 151 Wash. 2d 900, 
903–04, 93 P.3d 861, 864 (2004); Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d at 258, 906 P.2d at 327; Eikenberry, 
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these issues, the justices are deeply divided. The Court is also struggling 
to reach consensus on the test for appellate review, whether and when an 
error is structural, and what remedy should apply. 
II.  IN STATE V. BONE-CLUB, THE WASHINGTON STATE 
SUPREME COURT DEVISED ITS OWN TEST TO EVALUATE 
A PROPOSED COURTROOM CLOSURE 
The seminal Washington case governing issues of public trial under 
section 22 is State v. Bone-Club,19 which involved closure of a pretrial 
hearing to protect the identity of a witness who was an undercover 
detective. In Bone-Club the Washington State Supreme Court returned to 
the test used under article I, section 10 to protect the public’s right to 
access (first set out in Ishikawa and reiterated in Eikenberry), and 
adopted it for purposes of protecting a defendant’s right to a public trial 
under article I, section 22. The test has five parts, briefly summarized 
below: 
1. The proponent of closure must identify the interests or rights 
justifying closure and make some showing of the need therefore; if 
the closure is not sought to protect the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial, the proponent must show a serious and imminent threat to an 
important interest. 
2. Those present must be given an opportunity to object. 
3. The closure must be the least restrictive means available and 
effective to protect the interest. 
4. The court must weigh the competing interests, consider alternative 
methods, and should articulate specific findings and conclusions. 
5. The order must be no broader in its application or duration than 
necessary to serve its purpose.20 
The Court also held that the trial judge has the responsibility to 
protect a defendant’s right to a public trial.21 Because the judge had not 
engaged in this “weighing of the competing interests”22 before closing 
the hearing, the Court was unable to determine whether closure was 
warranted: “We hold the trial court’s failure to follow the five-step 
                                                     
121 Wash. 2d at 209–10, 848 P.2d at 1260–61; Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 36, 640 P.2d at 719; 
Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 59–60, 615 P.2d 440, 444–45 (1980). 
19. 128 Wash. 2d 254, 906 P.2d 325. 
20. Id. at 258–59, 906 P.2d at 327–28; see also Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 37–39, 640 P.2d at 720–
21.  
21. Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d at 256, 906 P.2d at 326. 
22. Id. at 256, 906 P.3d at 326.  
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closure test enunciated in this court’s section 10 cases violated 
Defendant’s right to a public trial under section 22.”23 The Court 
reversed and remanded for a new trial.24 
It soon became apparent that trial judges did not consider certain 
routine procedures (which ordinarily had no “proponent”) to be closures 
and so did not engage in the Bone-Club analysis before (most 
commonly) protecting privacy of prospective jurors and encouraging 
candor in their responses by using sealed questionnaires and conducting 
parts of voir dire in a closed courtroom or in chambers.25 About ten 
years after Bone-Club, the Court began addressing a series of such cases 
involving article I, section 22, and has vacated dozens of convictions in 
cases where the Bone-Club analysis was not applied.26 (As a result, the 
issue has become so familiar that in courthouses in Washington, “Bone-
Club” is now a verb.) 
In the wake of these reversals, Washington judges and practitioners 
have been asking practical questions, the most urgent of which are: to 
what proceedings does the public trial right attach? And what exactly is 
a closure? 
Certain basic things are clear. “[N]ot every interaction between the 
court, counsel, and defendants will implicate the right to a public trial, or 
constitute a closure if closed to the public.”27 But the public trial right is 
implicated (and thus Bone-Club analysis is required) when a proceeding 
                                                     
23. Id. at 261, 906 P.3d at 329. 
24. Id. 
25. This may be a result of language in the cases. In Ishikawa, prefacing the announcement of the 
test, the Court stated: “Each time restrictions on access to criminal hearings or the records from 
hearings are sought, courts must follow these steps . . . .” Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 37, 640 P.2d at 
720. In Bone-Club, the Court held that the trial judge has a responsibility to protect Defendant’s 
public trial right, and, citing Ishikawa, that “[t]he motion to close, not Defendant’s objection, 
triggered the trial court’s duty to perform the weighing procedure.” Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d at 
261, 906 P.2d at 329. Given that the test itself contemplates a proponent and opponent, trial judges 
may have believed that routine procedures not “sought” by any party were not the sort of procedures 
to which Bone-Club applied. See Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 39, 640 P.2d at 721. 
26. See, e.g., In re Morris, 176 Wash. 2d 157, 288 P.3d 1140 (2012); State v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d 
1, 288 P.3d 1113 (2012); State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 217 P.3d 310 (2009); State v. 
Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d 167, 137 P.3d 825 (2006); State v. Brightman, 155 Wash. 2d 506, 122 
P.3d 150 (2005); In re Orange, 152 Wash. 2d 795, 100 P.3d 291 (2005); State v. Hummel, 165 
Wash. App. 749, 266 P.3d 269 (2012); State v. Njonge, 161 Wash. App. 568, 255 P.3d 753 (2011); 
State v. Tinh Trinh Lam, 161 Wash. App. 299, 254 P.3d 891 (2011); State v. Leyerle, 158 Wash. 
App. 474, 242 P.3d 921 (2010); State v. Bowen, 157 Wash. App. 821, 239 P.3d 1114 (2010); State 
v. Waldon, 148 Wash. App. 952, 202 P.3d 325 (2009); State v. Sadler, 147 Wash. App. 97, 193 
P.3d 1108 (2008); State v. Erickson, 146 Wash. App. 200, 189 P.3d 245 (2008); State v. Duckett, 
141 Wash. App. 797, 173 P.3d 948 (2007); State v. Frawley, 140 Wash. App. 713, 167 P.3d 593 
(2007). For a discussion of some of these cases, see Lutzenhiser, supra note 4, at 1225–35. 
27. State v. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d 58, 71, 292 P.3d 715, 721 (2012). 
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normally conducted in open court, including jury voir dire, is purposely 
closed to the public.28 
Not yet clear are many of the larger questions, such as the proper test 
for determining exactly which proceedings implicate the defendant’s 
public trial right;29 whether the failure of a trial court to undertake a 
Bone-Club analysis is itself a constitutional error, regardless of whether 
the closure was justified;30 whether a public trial error (either unjustified 
closure or failure to conduct the Bone-Club analysis) is always structural 
error and not subject to harmless error analysis (and therefore always 
requires a new trial);31 whether the Washington appellate rule for review 
of constitutional errors raised for the first time on appeal applies in these 
cases;32 and whether, in the absence of a Bone-Club analysis, a 
reviewing court will examine the record to determine the 
constitutionality of a closure.33 
III.  THE FOUR RECENT DECISIONS REVEAL A DEEPENING 
DIVIDE 
The four decisions announced November 21, 2012 involved two types 
of closure: the private questioning of jurors, and an in-chambers 
conference to consider a question from a deliberating jury. The Court 
reached a narrow majority in two cases but only a plurality in the other 
two, and the opinions are notable for sharp disagreements on key issues. 
We begin with State v. Sublett34 (the only case in which the Court 
affirmed), because it announced a new test and because Chief Justice 
Madsen’s concurrence is a wide-ranging discussion that supplements her 
dissents in the other cases. 
A.  State v. Sublett: A Chambers Conference to Discuss a Question 
from the Deliberating Jury Does Not Implicate the Right to Public 
Trial 
In Sublett,35 the issue was the consideration, in chambers, of a 
                                                     
28. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 11–13, 288 P.3d at 1118–19. 
29. See infra Part III.A. 
30. See infra Part III.B. 
31. Id. 
32. See infra Parts III.B and C. 
33. See infra Parts III.A, B, and C. 
34. 176 Wash. 2d 58, 292 P.3d 715 (plurality opinion). 
35. The plurality opinion by Justice C. Johnson, was joined by Justices Chambers, Owens, and J. 
Johnson. Justice Stephens was joined in her concurrence by Justice Fairhurst, and Justice Pro 
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question from the jury about the court’s instructions. The justices 
unanimously agreed to affirm Sublett’s conviction. But the lead opinion 
garnered only a plurality, and the three separate concurrences 
demonstrate the disparate analytic paths the justices take, and the many 
areas in which consensus remains elusive. 
1. A Plurality Inaugurates a New Test 
During its deliberations in Michael Sublett’s trial for murder, the jury 
submitted a question regarding the court’s accomplice liability 
instruction.36 The court and counsel met in chambers and discussed the 
question. No one objected to the procedure. Counsel agreed with the 
court’s proposed answer, which was simply to tell the jury to reread the 
instructions.37 That answer was duly given and placed in the record, 
although no record was made of the chambers conference.38 The jury 
convicted Sublett on alternative charges of premeditated first-degree 
murder and felony murder, and the court sentenced him to life without 
the possibility of parole.39 
On direct appeal, Sublett argued that the discussion of the jury’s 
question in chambers violated his right to public trial. The Washington 
State Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed, holding that the public 
trial right does not extend to proceedings involving “purely ministerial 
or legal issues that do not require the resolution of disputed facts,”40 and 
that because the jury’s question involved a “purely legal” issue, 
consideration in chambers did not implicate the right.41 
The Washington State Supreme Court also affirmed, but on different 
reasoning. Writing for a plurality, Justice Charles Johnson reiterated that 
despite the strong presumption that courts are to be open at all stages of 
trial, the public trial right is not absolute, and may be overcome to serve 
“an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential and 
narrowly tailored to preserve higher values.”42 The Court observed that 
“not every interaction between the court, counsel, and defendants will 
                                                     
Tempore Alexander. Justice Wiggins concurred in result only. Chief Justice Madsen wrote a 
separate concurrence. 
36. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 67, 292 P.3d at 719. 
37. Id. 
38. Id.  
39. Id.  
40. Id. at 67–68, 292 P.3d at 719.  
41. Id. at 68, 292 P.3d at 719. 
42. Id. at 71, 292 P.3d at 721 (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984)). 
10 - Ellington & Lutzenhiser Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/17/2013  1:57 PM 
500 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:491 
 
implicate the right to a public trial, or constitute a closure if closed to the 
public.”43 
But the Court rejected the legal/factual distinction made by the Court 
of Appeals,44 reasoning that although the distinction “somewhat 
parallels” its desired approach, it was inadequate to protect a defendant’s 
public trial right because “[t]he resolution of legal issues is quite often 
accomplished during an adversarial proceeding, and disputed facts are 
sometimes resolved by stipulation following informal conferencing 
between counsel.”45 In her concurrence, Justice Stephens explicitly 
rejected the legal/factual distinction, otherwise agreeing with the 
plurality on all issues.46 A majority of the Court thus found the 
legal/factual distinction at least inadequate, standing alone, to protect 
defendants’ and the public’s right to an open trial. 
Instead, the Court adopted the “experience and logic test,” which 
originated in a 1986 U.S. Supreme Court case, Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court (Press II).47 The Sublett Court found this test desirable 
because it allows the trial court “to consider the actual proceeding at 
issue for what it is, without having to force every situation into 
predefined factors.”48 
The experience and logic test has two parts. The experience prong 
determines “whether the place and process have historically been open 
to the press and general public.”49 The logic prong determines “whether 
public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the 
particular process in question.”50 If the answer to both questions is yes, 
the right to public trial is implicated, and the court must analyze the 
proposed closure using the Bone-Club factors.51 
Applying the test to the facts in Sublett, the Court held the right to a 
public trial did not attach to the chambers conference. Considering the 
experience prong, the Court analogized consideration of the jury’s 
                                                     
43. Id.  
44. Id.  
45. Id. at 72, 292 P.3d at 722. 
46. Id. at 136, 292 P.3d at 753 (Stephens, J., concurring). 
47. 478 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1986) (holding that a qualified First Amendment right of access attaches 
to preliminary hearings and that such a proceeding can therefore not be closed unless specific, on 
the record findings are made demonstrating that “closure is essential to preserve higher values and is 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
48. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 73, 292 P.3d at 722.  
49. Press II, 478 U.S. at 8. 
50. Id. 
51. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 73, 292 P.3d at 722.  
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question to a jury instruction conference, an informal proceeding often 
held in places other than an open courtroom, and concluded that the 
place and process have in fact not historically been open to the press and 
public. The Court also emphasized that the procedure for handling 
questions from a jury is controlled by a court rule, CrR6.15(f), which 
requires that jury questions be submitted in writing.52 The trial judge has 
discretion to manage a jury question in open court, but CrR 6.15(f)(1) 
does not require it.53 Considering that the rule is apparently the only 
authority governing the process of handling questions from a 
deliberating jury, the Court concluded that consideration of a 
deliberating jury’s question has historically not been open to the press 
and public. Regarding the “logic prong,” the Court decided that “none of 
the values served by the public trial right is violated under the facts of 
this case.”54 Rights attaching to the trial itself—the right to appear, to 
cross-examine witnesses, to introduce or exclude evidence—do not 
attach to the process governing the court’s handling of a question from 
the deliberating jury where the question concerns the court’s 
instructions.55 Thus there was no violation of Sublett’s right to a public 
trial. 
In her concurrence, Justice Stephens approved both the result and the 
adoption of the experience and logic test.56 She wrote separately because 
the plurality had not completely rejected the distinction between “purely 
ministerial or legal” proceedings and those that “require the resolution of 
disputed facts.”57 She contended the distinction is faulty, misleading, and 
premised on labels rather than substance.58 Justice Stephens also wrote 
separately to express sharp disagreement with the arguments of Chief 
Justice Madsen and Justice Wiggins, whose concurrences advocated 
application of Rule of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 2.5(a)(3) to determine 
whether a court will grant review. Justice Stephens took the position that 
such a requirement incorrectly equates failure to object with voluntary 
waiver: “We have repeatedly and conclusively rejected a 
                                                     
52. Id. at 76, 292 P.3d at 724. The rule next requires that “the court’s response and any objections 
thereto shall be made a part of the record,” and finally that “[t]he court shall respond . . . in open 
court or in writing . . . [a]ny additional instruction upon any point of law shall be given in writing.” 
Id. 
53. Id.  
54. Id. at 77, 292 P.3d at 724.  
55. Id.  
56. Id. at 136, 292 P.3d at 753 (Stephens, J., concurring). 
57. Id. at 136, 292 P.3d at 753 (quoting State v. Sublett, 156 Wash. App. 160, 181, 231 P.3d 231, 
242 (2010)). 
58. See id. at 136–42, 292 P.3d at 753–756. 
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contemporaneous objection rule in the context of the public trial right.”59 
2.  Concurring Chief Justice Madsen and Justice Wiggins Agree with 
Plurality’s Result, but Take Issue With Its Analysis 
In his concurrence, Justice Wiggins argued that the federal experience 
and logic test actually conflicts with article I, section 10 of the 
Washington Constitution,60 because “[u]nder article I, section 10, every 
part of the administration of justice is presumptively open”61: 
[T]he United States Supreme Court is much freer to limit 
courtroom openness than we are. With this in mind, I would 
reject the experience and logic test because it is contrary to the 
plain language of article I, section 10. We cannot say, on the one 
hand, that justice must be administered openly, but that on the 
other hand certain stages of a proceeding can be closed to the 
public because experience and logic tell us they can be closed. 
This is a contradiction. Either our courts are open, or they are 
not.62 
Justice Wiggins also described the test as similar to the “so-called 
‘triviality’ or ‘de minimis’ approach, which is used in the federal courts 
but that we have declined to adopt.”63 Justice Wiggins would distinguish 
the right to open trial from the remedy—the right to open administration 
of justice from “entitlement to a certain form of relief (namely, a new 
trial).”64 He argued that for purposes of appellate review, closure cases 
are no different from other constitutional error cases and should be 
governed by the usual rule, which is RAP 2.5.65 Under the rule, an 
appellant who did not object to an alleged error at trial may obtain 
review only by showing “manifest constitutional error”—that is, 
constitutional error that prejudices the outcome, error that has “practical 
and identifiable consequences in the trial of the case.”66 Justice Wiggins 
                                                     
59. Id. at 143, 292 P.3d at 756–57 (citations omitted). 
60. Id. at 145, 292 P.3d at 759 (Wiggins, J., concurring). 
61. Id. at 147, 292 P.3d at 759. 
62. Id. at 148–9, 292 P.3d at 759 (citations omitted). Justice Wiggins pointed to the problems 
identifying “experience” under the test, noting that research will be difficult and questioning the 
relevance of experience after adoption of the State Constitution in 1889. He concluded that “[i]t is 
simpler and more true to our constitution merely to say that all phases of judicial proceedings are 
presumptively open.” Id. at 147, 292 P.3d at 760. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 151, 292 P.3d at 761. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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rejected Justice Stephens’ argument that applying the rule amounts to 
treating silence as a waiver of the right, pointing out that the rule is by 
definition a rule for review of constitutional error not objected to 
below,67 and review will be undertaken if prejudice occurred.68 He 
declined to rely upon State v. Marsh,69 the Washington case cited by his 
colleagues for the proposition that failure to object does not constitute a 
waiver, because it preceded the Rules of Appellate Procedure by fifty 
years: “Marsh [does not] justify disregarding our rules of appellate 
procedure.”70 
In concurrence, Chief Justice Madsen voiced general arguments 
regarding the Court’s jurisprudence in this area. She expressly intended 
her concurrence, together with her dissents in the three other cases 
decided the same day (State v. Wise,71 State v. Paumier,72 and In re 
Morris,73 discussed below) to constitute “a single opinion touching on 
the multiple aspects of the public trial right and appellate review as they 
are presented by all four cases.”74 Her objective was to explain “why I 
believe the court’s approach to reviewing public trial issues is 
exceptionally and unnecessarily strict.”75 
As to the scope of the right to public trial, Chief Justice Madsen 
believes both the ministerial/factual analysis and the logic and 
experience test are useful tools for determining when the right attaches.76 
She observed that under both tests, history matters; if the history of the 
type of proceeding subject to closure provides no answer, the court must 
examine the values protected by the right and whether those values are 
served by requiring a particular part of the proceedings to be open.77 The 
values are those identified in the U.S. Supreme Court case Waller v. 
                                                     
67. Id. at 154, 292 P.3d at 762. 
68. Id. at 153, 292 P.2d at 762. 
69. 126 Wash. 142, 217 P. 705 (1923). 
70. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 153, 292 P.3d at 761 (Wiggins, J., concurring). 
71. 176 Wash. 2d 1, 288 P.3d 1113 (2012). 
72. 176 Wash. 2d 29, 288 P.3d 1126 (2012). 
73. 176 Wash. 2d 157, 288 P.3d 1140 (2012). 
74. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 90, 292 P.3d at 731 (Madsen, C.J., concurring).  
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 99, 292 P.3d at 735. But she pointed out that the experience and logic test has been used 
to determine the scope of the right to open access under the First Amendment; she found no case 
applying the test to determine the scope of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right, id. at 94, 292 P.3d 
at 733, and she noted the reminder from the United States Supreme Court in Presley v. Georgia that 
“the extent to which the First and Sixth amendment public trial rights are coextensive is an open 
question.” Id. at 95, 292 P.3d at 733 (quoting Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010)). 
77. Id. at 98–99, 292 P.3d at 735.  
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Georgia78: ensuring a fair trial, reminding participants of their functions 
and their obligation to the accused, and encouraging witnesses to come 
forward and testify truthfully.79 If the values are served by openness, 
then the right attaches and a Bone-Club inquiry is required. If those 
values are not served, “there is no constitutionally imperative reason for 
attaching the public trial right to the particular part of the proceedings.”80 
Chief Justice Madsen’s principal concern is the Court’s practice of 
ordering a new trial in “virtually every case where a closure occurred 
without” a Bone-Club analysis.81 “It is a mystery why, if the trial court 
does not engage in an on-the-record Bone-Club inquiry . . . this court 
believes it must foreclose all other possible ways in which the inquiry 
could be conducted.”82 She agreed with Justice Wiggins that review 
should be governed by the usual rule for constitutional error not raised 
below, RAP 2.5(a)(3), which requires a showing of prejudice resulting 
from the closure.83 She criticized the plurality’s reliance on Waller, 
pointing out that there, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that closure 
of the suppression hearing may have been partly justified, and ordered 
the trial court on remand to consider what portions, if any, of a new 
hearing could be closed.84 She termed it a “poor result” that the majority 
has adopted a rule requiring a new trial without a showing of prejudice.85 
She also contended that the reviewing court should conduct its own 
examination of the record to determine whether error occurred, and if the 
record proves inadequate to the purpose, should consider remand for 
development of the record rather than automatically ordering a new trial. 
She pointed out that in State v. Momah,86 the Court determined from the 
record that no violation occurred.87 
                                                     
78. 467 U.S. 39 (1984). 
79. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 99, 292 P.3d at 735 (Madsen, C.J., concurring) (citing Waller, 467 
U.S. at 46–47). 
80. Id.  
81. Id. at 90, 292 P.3d at 731.  
82. Id. at 105, 292 P.3d at 738.  
83. See id. at 123–28, 292 P.3d at 747–49. 
84. Id. at 116–17, 292 P.3d at 743–44.  
85. Id. at 115, 292 P.3d at 743. 
86. 167 Wash. 2d 140, 217 P.3d 321 (2009). 
87. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 119–20, 292 P.3d at 745 (Madsen, C.J., concurring). 
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B.  State v. Paumier and State v. Wise: Failure to Conduct a Bone-
Club Inquiry Is a Violation of the Right to Public Trial and Is Itself 
“Structural Error” 
In Paumier and Wise,88 a narrow majority of the Court agreed that the 
failure to conduct a Bone-Club inquiry before ordering a closure is not 
only error that violates the right to public trial, but also is “structural 
error,” which requires automatic reversal and remand for a new trial. 
Vigorous dissents rejected this “rigid” rule in favor of application of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and a post trial inquiry that could satisfy 
the requirements of Bone-Club without the time and expense of a new 
trial. 
1.  The Wise and Paumier Majorities Hold the Absence of the Bone-
Club Test Constitutes “Structural Error” 
Wise and Paumier both involved private questioning of prospective 
jurors during voir dire.89 In both cases, the Court held to its earlier 
view90 that such private questioning, undertaken without weighing the 
competing constitutional interests through a Bone-Club inquiry, 
constituted a closure that violated the defendant’s right to public trial.91 
In Wise, the Court drew a series of bright lines. First, the Court 
reiterated that private questioning of prospective jurors in chambers is a 
closure requiring consideration of the Bone-Club criteria.92 Second, 
closure without such consideration violates the defendant’s right to 
public trial.93 Third, violation of the right to public trial is “structural 
error.”94 And fourth, the Court went further, expressly holding that the 
failure to conduct a Bone-Club analysis is itself structural error which is 
                                                     
88. In both cases, Justice Owens was joined by Justices Chambers, Fairhurst, and Stephens, and 
Justice Pro Tem Alexander and Chief Justice Madsen wrote a dissenting opinion. In Paumier, 
Justice Wiggins dissented, joined by Justices C. Johnson and J. Johnson; in Wise, Justice J. Johnson 
dissented, joined by Justices C. Johnson and Wiggins. 
89. In Wise, the subjects discussed during the private questioning included personal health 
matters, relationships with witnesses or law enforcement, and criminal history. State v. Wise, 176 
Wash. 2d 1, 7, 288 P.3d 1113, 1116 (2012). In-chambers discussion in Paumier included personal 
health issues, criminal history, and familiarity with the defendant or the crime. State v. Paumier, 176 
Wash. 2d 29, 33, 288 P.3d 1126, 1128 (2012). 
90. State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 223, 217 P.3d 310, 312 (2009). 
91. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 6, 288 P.3d at 1115; Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 32, 288 P.3d at 1128. 
92. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 11, 288 P.3d at 1118. 
93. Id. at 13, 288 P.3d at 1119. 
94. Id. at 13–14, 288 P.3d at 1119. 
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per se prejudicial and automatically requires a new trial.95 The Court 
further held that failure to object at trial does not constitute a waiver of 
the right to public trial that would preclude raising the issue on appeal, 
because such a waiver requires an affirmative indication of the 
defendant’s understanding of the right.96 
Structural error is a special category of constitutional error that, even 
where it does not appear to prejudice a particular defendant, “affect[s] 
the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than [being] 
simply an error in the trial process itself.”97 Where such error occurs, “a 
criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for 
determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be 
regarded as fundamentally fair.”98 Structural error is presumed 
prejudicial and is not subject to harmless error review.99 
In both Wise and Paumier, the dissent argued that the defendants 
actually benefited from the closures because prospective jurors may have 
been more candid about hardships and biases in private questioning.100 
In each case, however, the majority was unmoved by the apparent 
absence of prejudice, emphasizing that by its nature, a structural error 
has the potential to weaken the foundations of justice: “It is the 
framework of our system of justice that we must protect against erosion 
of the public trial right.”101 
Regarding remedy, the Wise Court noted that remand for a new public 
proceeding might be appropriate where the violation occurred in the 
context of an “easily separable” proceeding such as a suppression 
hearing.102 But the Court concluded it could not “reasonably order a 
‘redo’ of voir dire to remedy the public trial violation that occurred 
here.”103 The Court vacated Wise’s conviction and remanded for a new 
                                                     
95. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 6, 288 P.3d at 1115. The Court also held this in Paumier, 176 Wash. 
2d at 37, 288 P.3d at 1130. 
96. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 15, 288 P.3d at 1120; see also State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 229 
n.3, 217 P.3d 310, 315 n.3 (2009) (explaining that the right to public trial is protected in the same 
constitutional provision as the right to trial by jury, and so can likewise be waived only in a 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner). 
97. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 13–14, 288 P.3d at 1119 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
279, 310 (1991)). 
98. Id. at 14, 288 P.3d at 1119 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310). 
99. Id. 
100. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 25, 288 P.3d at 1125 (J. Johnson, J., dissenting); Paumier, 176 Wash. 
2d at 52, 288 P.3d at 1137 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).  
101. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 18, 288 P.3d at 1121.  
102. Id. at 19, 288 P.3d at 1122. 
103. Id.  
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trial “that is open to the public, except as the trial court may direct a 
closure upon full scrutiny and consideration of the public trial right 
under Bone-Club.”104 The holding in Paumier was nearly identical.105 
2.  Dissenters Decry “Rigid Rules” and Reject Automatic Application 
of the Structural Error Doctrine 
Chief Justice Madsen dissented in Wise and Paumier. Justice James 
Johnson also dissented in Wise and was joined by Justices Wiggins and 
Charles Johnson. In Paumier, Justice Wiggins authored a dissent joined 
by Justices Charles Johnson and James Johnson. 
Chief Justice Madsen’s dissent reiterated her rejection of the 
proposition that mere failure to engage in a Bone-Club inquiry is itself 
structural error.106 She contended the transformation of the Bone-Club 
inquiry into an independent, substantive constitutional right is 
unwarranted and has far-reaching consequences.107 In Sublett, she had 
argued that “the failure to engage in the inquiry should not turn a 
justifiable closure into a violation of the right to a public trial.”108 She 
noted again in Wise that the closure may well have been constitutionally 
justified,109 and accused the majority of adopting a “rigid doctrine”110 
with “inflexible rules”111 which result in a “costly and unnecessary 
response that is not constitutionally required.”112 
Instead, Chief Justice Madsen argued that the reviewing court should 
examine the record to determine whether or not the closures at trial were 
justified.113 She observed that courts in other jurisdictions regularly 
engage in posttrial inquiries to determine whether a closure was 
justified,114 and that the United States Supreme Court itself did exactly 
                                                     
104. Id. 
105. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 37, 288 P.3d at 1130.  
106. Id. at 39, 288 P.3d at 1131 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting).  
107. Id. at 39–40, 288 P.3d at 1131–32; Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 22, 288 P.3d at 1123 (Madsen, 
C.J., dissenting). 
108. State v. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d 58, 103, 292 P.3d 715, 737 (2012) (Madsen, C.J., 
concurring).  
109. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 23, 288 P.2d at 1124 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
110. Id. at 20, 288 P.3d at 1123.  
111. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 38, 288 P.3d 1131 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
112. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 21, 288 P.3d at 1123 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
113. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 40, 288 P.3d at 1132 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting).  
114. State v. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d 58, 105–06, 292 P.3d 715, 738 (2012) (Madsen, C.J., 
concurring) (discussing Kendrick v. State and People v. Kline among other cases). In Kendrick v. 
State, 670 N.E.2d 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), the trial court had failed to enter specific findings 
concerning its order excluding certain persons from the courtroom during the testimony of a 
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that in Waller.115 She reminded her colleagues that in Momah, the 
Washington State Supreme Court itself examined the record on review 
and determined that closure of voir dire did not violate the right to public 
trial and therefore did not constitute structural error.116 She argued that 
the decisions in Wise and Paumier have “ignored Momah,”117 
“distinguished [Momah] out of existence,”118 and even “turn[ed] 
precedent into pretense.”119 
Under Chief Justice Madsen’s approach, if the record does not 
indicate whether the closure was justified, remand would be appropriate 
to clarify the reasons for closure under the Bone-Club factors.120 If the 
review shows the closure was justified and did not violate the 
defendant’s public trial right, “then the matter is at an end.”121 If the 
inquiry reveals an unjustified, unconstitutional closure, “then, and only 
then, would it be necessary to decide whether the violation was 
structural error requiring reversal and a new trial.”122 
If it turns out that an unconstitutional closure did occur, Chief Justice 
Madsen and Justices James Johnson, Charles Johnson, and Wiggins all 
agree that Rule of Appellate Procedure 2.5(a)(3) should govern review. 
The Paumier majority’s discussion of RAP 2.5(a)(3) and its statement 
that the rule “does not apply in its typical manner here”123 generated a 
strong response from Chief Justice Madsen in her Sublett concurrence; 
she charged the Court with sweeping aside “the entire scheme of 
                                                     
confidential informant in a felony drug dealing case. Id. at 370. The Indiana Court of Appeals 
initially remanded the case to the trial court in order to obtain those findings. Id. The Court of 
Appeals then applied the Waller test to those findings, and determined that the court had identified 
an overriding interest—the protection of a confidential informant—and that the closure (exclusion 
of two friends of the defendant, who had a history of violence) was “narrowly tailored to protect the 
witness with as little impact as possible on the defendant’s right to a public trial.” Id. at 371. 
In People v. Kline, 494 N.W.2d 756 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), the trial court failed to make findings 
on the record to support closure during the testimony of a young rape victim. Id. at 760. The 
Michigan Court of Appeals emphasized the importance (articulated in Waller and Press-Enterprise 
I) of specific findings in order to determine if a closure order was proper. Id. at 760–61. The court in 
Kline remanded to the trial court “with directions to supplement the record with the facts and 
reasoning” that supported its decision to clear the courtroom. Id.   
115. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 41, 288 P.3d at 1132 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
116. Id. at 42, 288 P.3d at 1133.  
117. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 24, 288 P.3d at 1124 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting).  
118. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 40, 288 P.3d at 1131 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting).  
119. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 24, 288 P.3d at 1124 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting). 
120. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 41, 288 P.3d at 1132 (Madsen, J., dissenting).  
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 42, 288 P.3d at 1132.  
123. Id. at 36, 288 P.3d at 1130 (majority opinion). 
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appellate review under the rules . . . . With this breathtaking, and 
incorrect, conclusion, the majority completely dispenses with the rules 
for addressing constitutional error on review.”124 
Applying the rule to the facts of Wise, Justice James Johnson argued 
that “there is no indication that the individual questioning of potential 
jurors prejudiced Wise. If anything, Wise benefited from the information 
obtained from the potential jurors’ candid responses.”125 He concluded: 
“the alleged error was not “manifest” and Wise cannot raise it for the 
first time on appeal.”126 Justice Wiggins reached the same conclusion in 
Paumier.127 
Justice James Johnson in Wise and Justice Wiggins in Paumier both 
highlighted Momah, in which, as Justice Wiggins notes, the Court held 
that “not every public trial violation is structural error.”128 Justice 
Wiggins pointed out that Momah “is consistent with United States 
Supreme Court precedent.”129 Both Justices concluded that Washington 
precedent does not require the conclusion that a violation of the right to 
public trial is necessarily structural.130 Justice Wiggins argued that the 
improper voir dire closure in Paumier, while a violation of the public 
trial right, did not constitute structural error because it: 
[D]id not render the trial unfair, nor did it convert an otherwise 
sound trial into an unreliable vehicle for determination of guilt 
or innocence. An error like this fails to meet the high standard 
for structural error . . . . If anything, in-chambers voir dire 
protects the defendant’s right to a fair and unbiased trial.131 
                                                     
124. State v. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d 58, 127, 288 P.3d 715, 749 (2012) (Madsen, C.J., 
concurring). 
125. State v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d 1, 25, 288 P.3d 1113, 1125 (J. Johnson, J., dissenting).  
126. Id. 
127. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 54–56, 288 P.3d at 1139–40 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). 
128. Id. at 47, 288 P.3d at 1135 (emphasis in original) (citing State v. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d 140, 
150–51, 217 P.3d 321, 326–27 (2009)).  
129. Id. 
130. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 26, 288 P.3d at 1125 (J. Johnson, J., dissenting) (“Our precedent does 
not command this result.”); Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 49, 288 P.3d at 1136 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) 
(“[W]e have never held that partial in-chambers voir dire without a Bone-Club analysis is structural 
error.”). 
131. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 50–51, 288 P.3d at 1136 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original). 
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C.  In re Morris: Public Trial Violation Claims Raised on Collateral 
Review Decided on Grounds of Ineffective Assistance of Appellate 
Counsel 
Collateral review is handled in Washington by way of a Personal 
Restraint Petition (PRP).132 In In re Morris,133 the Court analogized to In 
re Orange.134 In that earlier case, the Washington State Supreme Court 
granted Orange’s PRP and remanded for a new trial, holding that his 
attorney’s failure to raise a public trail issue on direct review constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel. In In re Morris, a plurality followed 
Orange, holding that Morris’ appellate counsel was similarly ineffective. 
The two dissenters emphasized factual differences in Orange, and 
procedural distinctions between direct appeal and collateral review. 
1.  Plurality Holds that Morris, like Orange, Established Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel 
On direct appeal, Patrick Morris challenged certain evidentiary 
rulings but did not claim any violation of his right to public trial.135 His 
convictions were affirmed and the Washington State Supreme Court 
denied further review in 2007.136 In 2008, Morris sought collateral relief 
in a PRP, contending the trial court violated his public trial right by 
privately questioning potential jurors in chambers, and his appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue in his appeal.137 
Morris filed his appeal shortly after the Court decided Orange. 
Christopher Orange alleged for the first time in a PRP that an 
unconstitutional closure occurred when the trial court, citing space 
limitations, excluded all spectators from the courtroom during the whole 
of voir dire and refused to make exceptions for Orange’s family or that 
of the victim.138 Orange alleged in his PRP that his counsel on direct 
appeal was ineffective for failing to raise that issue. The Washington 
State Supreme Court agreed, holding that the exclusion was a closure 
                                                     
132. See generally WASH. R. APP. P. 16.3–16.15. 
133. 176 Wash. 2d 157, 288 P.3d 1140 (2012). Writing for a plurality, Justice Owens was joined 
by Justices Fairhurst and Stephens and Justice Pro Tempore Alexander. Justice Chambers wrote a 
separate concurrence, and Chief Justice Madsen, wrote a separate dissent. Justice Wiggins also 
dissented, joined by Justices C. Johnson and J. Johnson.  
134. 152 Wash. 2d 795, 100 P.3d 291 (2005). 
135. Morris, 176 Wash. 2d at 164, 288 P.3d at 1143.  
136. Id. at 164, 288 P.3d at 1144. 
137. Id. at 164–65, 288 P.3d at 1144. 
138. Orange, 152 Wash. 2d at 802–03, 100 P.3d at 294–95. 
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and was per se prejudicial, that appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to raise the issue,139 and that the proper remedy was remand for a 
new trial.140 
The plurality in Morris applied the same analysis, concluding that 
Orange “clarified, without qualification, both that Bone-Club applied to 
jury selection and that closure of voir dire to the public without the 
requisite analysis was a presumptively prejudicial error on direct 
appeal.”141 Morris’ appellate counsel had therefore been ineffective for 
failing to raise the issue, and “[n]o clearer prejudice could be 
established.”142 As in Orange, the plurality in Morris remanded for a 
new trial.143 
2.  Dissenters Distinguish Orange, Dispute Ineffective Assistance 
Holding, and Emphasize the Distinction Between Direct and 
Collateral Review 
In separate dissents, Chief Justice Madsen and Justice Wiggins144 
argued strenuously that Orange is factually distinguishable and should 
not control the result in Morris.145 Justice Wiggins noted that the public 
trial violation in Orange was “conspicuous in the record”146 with an 
objection made by counsel at trial, whereas Morris and his attorney 
made no objection and by their conduct expressed approval of the in-
chambers questioning of prospective jurors.147 Chief Justice Madsen 
argued that Morris’ appellate counsel could reasonably have concluded 
from the trial record that “the closure was justified by juror privacy plus 
the defendant’s interest in a fair trial decided by unbiased jurors. Closure 
for the purpose of obtaining full answers to sensitive questioning served 
both of these purposes.”148 Justice Wiggins also argued that, while 
hindsight might make the issue an obvious argument on appeal, it was 
common practice in courts in Washington and other jurisdictions to 
conduct limited in-chambers voir dire, and Morris’s appellate counsel 
                                                     
139. Id. at 800, 100 P.3d at 293. 
140. Id.  
141. Morris, 176 Wash. 2d at 167, 288 P.3d at 1145.  
142. Id. at 166, 288 P.3d at 1144. 
143. Id. at 168, 288 P.3d at 1145. 
144. Justice Wiggins was joined by Justices Charles Johnson and James Johnson. 
145. Morris, 176 Wash. 2d at 177–79, 288 P.3d at 1149–50 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting); id. at 
184–85, 288 P.3d at 1153–54 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).   
146. Id. at 185, 288 P.3d at 1153 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). 
147. Id. at 185, 288 P.3d at 1153–54. 
148. Id. at 177, 288 P.3d at 1150 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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was hardly “constitutionally deficient for failing to raise and develop 
what may have been a novel legal argument at the time.”149 Both Justices 
argued that in contrast to Orange, no deficient performance was 
apparent on the appellate record in Morris.150 
Justice Wiggins also underscored the differences between direct 
appeal and collateral review: “Our PRP procedures reflect a crucial and 
enduring belief in the importance of finality, [and] [i]t is for this very 
reason that we require personal restraint petitioners to demonstrate 
prejudice as a prerequisite to relief.”151 Morris demonstrated no 
prejudice, and prejudice should not be presumed; “[t]o conclude 
otherwise ignores the differences between direct and collateral 
review.”152 
Finally, Justice Wiggins decried the harm resulting from automatic 
reversal: “It does not serve the interests of justice to reopen this long-
decided case, requiring a young girl to relive old traumas, and granting a 
windfall new trial to a man convicted of sexually molesting his 
daughter.”153 
IV.  WASHINGTON OPEN COURTS JURISPRUDENCE REMAINS 
UNSETTLED 
These four decisions reflect the wide divisions on the Court and the 
consequent difficulty of gathering a majority. The analysis of many 
common issues is thus unsettled. Future cases will also be affected by 
the changing membership of the Court: the two newest justices have not 
yet participated in decisions on open courts questions. 
A. Some Questions Have Been Decided 
Certain things are clear. The article I, section 22 public trial right 
applies to proceedings usually conducted in open court, including voir 
dire.154 If the right applies, a closure occurs when observers are excluded 
by clearing the courtroom or by moving proceedings into private 
                                                     
149. Id. at 186, 288 P.3d at 1154 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). 
150. Id. at 178, 288 P.3d at 1150 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting); id. at 185–86, 288 P.3d at 1153–54 
(Wiggins, J., dissenting). 
151. Id. at 180, 288 P.3d at 1151 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).  
152. Id. at 183, 288 P.3d at 1153. 
153. Id. at 186, 288 P.3d at 1154. 
154. State v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d 1, 11, 288 P.3d 1113, 1118 (2012); State v. Lormor, 172 Wash. 
2d 85, 92, 257 P.3d 624, 628 (2011). 
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places.155 Complete exclusion of the public from proceedings in a 
courtroom is a closure.156 Inadequate space for both the public and the 
jury venire does not justify a closure.157 Wholesale exclusion of the 
defendant’s family is a closure.158 
On the other hand, the public trial right does not prevent the court 
from exercising its discretion to control the courtroom environment; the 
exclusion of one person, even a family member, to reduce noise and 
possible distractions is not a violation of the right.159 Questioning jurors 
one at a time in open court is not a closure even if the remaining venire 
is kept elsewhere.160 When the judge meets with counsel in chambers to 
consider a question from a deliberating jury about the court’s 
instructions, the public trial right is not violated.161 Nor does the right 
apply to jury instruction conferences.162 
B.  Other Issues Remain Unresolved 
Substantive areas that remain uncertain include the scope of the right, 
the role of the structural error doctrine, and the impact of the experience 
and logic test. These uncertainties are discussed in turn. 
1.  Scope of the Right: To Which Proceedings Does the Public Trial 
Right Attach? 
To answer this question the Sublett Court adopted the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s experience and logic test from Press II, which involved closure 
of preliminary hearings in California.163 The “experience” prong inquires 
whether a proceeding has “historically been open to the press and 
general public.”164 Press II found the preliminary hearings to be similar 
in nature to probable cause hearings, which are like trials and have 
traditionally been open; this satisfied the experience prong.165 The 
Washington State Supreme Court thus gave great weight to past 
                                                     
155. See Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d at 92–93, 257 P.3d at 628–29. 
156. Id. at 92, 257 P.3d at 628.  
157. In re Orange ,152 Wash. 2d 795, 809–10, 100 P.3d 291, 298 (2005). 
158. See, e.g., id. at 800–01, 100 P.3d at 293–94. 
159. Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d at 96–97, 257 P.3d at 630. 
160. State v. Vega, 144 Wash. App. 914, 917, 184 P.3d 677, 679 (2008). 
161. State v. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d 58, 77–78, 292 P.3d at 724–25 (2012). 
162. Id. at 75, 292 P.3d at 723. 
163. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press II), 478 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1986). 
164. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 73, 292 P.3d at 722. 
165. Press II, 478 U.S. at 12–13. 
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practices in handling questions from a deliberating jury. 
This presents a puzzle, however. Questioning potential jurors in 
chambers is also a practice of long-standing and wide use, but this 
history has played no part in the Court’s analysis (and rejection) of the 
practice, before or after Sublett.166 We therefore do not know how the 
Court will apply the history part of the experience prong. 
Under the logic prong, the trial court must determine whether 
openness plays “a significant positive role in the functioning of the 
particular process in question.”167 The Court has not clarified what the 
hallmarks of significance might be, or what is meant by “functioning of 
the particular process.” The experience and logic test thus appears to 
combine a number of somewhat elastic ideas that will need to be further 
developed. 
The Court will also have to revisit whether the experience and logic 
test can or should be supplemented with other inquiries, because there 
does not yet appear to be a majority view on the subject. In Sublett, the 
plurality rejected the Court of Appeals’ legal/factual test as inadequate, 
standing alone, because it failed to recognize that proceedings often 
involve a mixture of content, and the test encourages reliance on labels 
rather than substance. This is a fair criticism, but leaves unanswered how 
the substance of the proceeding affects the analysis. 
2.  What Role Should the Structural Error Doctrine Play? (And What 
About Momah?) 
One of the most difficult questions is application of the structural 
error doctrine, which governs both reviewability and remedy. A 
structural error is presumed prejudicial, and requires automatic reversal. 
It is to be hoped that the Court will apply this doctrine more cautiously 
going forward, for several reasons. 
First, the doctrine has federal roots and is only recently part of 
Washington case law.168 Traditional federal analysis includes a strong 
presumption that constitutional errors are not structural,169 and that 
structural errors are rare. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in 
                                                     
166. See generally State v. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d 29, 288 P.3d 1126 (2012); State v. Wise, 176 
Wash. 2d 1, 288 P.3d 1113 (2012). 
167. Press II, 478 U.S. at 8. 
168. See State v. Vreen, 143 Wash. 2d 923, 930, 26 P.3d 236, 239 (2001); In re Benn, 134 Wash. 
2d 868, 921, 952 P.2d 116, 143 (1998).  
169. Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S 212, 218 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999). 
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Arizona v. Fulminante,170 a “structural” error is a “defect affecting the 
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in 
the trial process itself.”171 In Neder v. United States,172 the Supreme 
Court characterized structural errors as “infect[ing] the entire trial 
process,” and depriving defendants of “basic protections” such that “no 
criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.”173 If a 
constitutional error is structural, a conviction cannot stand, because such 
errors are presumptively and irrebuttably prejudicial.174 In Washington v. 
Recuenco,175 the U.S. Supreme Court described the “rare cases” in which 
an error will be structural, thus requiring automatic reversal: “In such 
cases, the error necessarily renders a criminal trial fundamentally unfair 
or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.”176 Structural 
error has been found in cases involving, for example, complete denial of 
counsel, coerced confession, racial discrimination in selection of a grand 
jury, denial of self-representation at trial, complete denial of public trial, 
and defective reasonable-doubt jury instructions.177 But as the Recuenco 
Court emphasized, “most constitutional errors can be harmless.”178 
Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis, “a constitutional error is 
either structural or it is not,”179 and once an error has been determined to 
be non-structural the test is: 
[W]hether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained . . . . An 
otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the 
reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that 
the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.180 
There is nothing in the federal cases to suggest that an open courts 
violation is always structural error, and the Washington State Supreme 
Court has not explained why a more strict application of the doctrine in 
section 22 cases is required by the state constitution. 
                                                     
170. 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
171. Id. at 310. 
172. 527 U.S. 1. 
173. Id. at 8–9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
174. See id.  
175. 548 U.S. 212 (2006). 
176. Id. at 218–19 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 8). 
177. Id. at 219 n.2 (collecting cases). 
178. Id. at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
179. Neder, 527 U.S. at 14. 
180. Id. at 15 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)). 
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Second, the Court has not been consistent in applying the structural 
error doctrine to the public trial right. In Bone-Club,181 Easterling,182 In 
re Orange,183 State v. Brightman,184 and Strode,185 the trial court closed 
the courtroom (or conducted voir dire in chambers) for a portion of a 
criminal trial, each time without benefit of the required balancing of 
interests. The Court held that each closure rendered the trial 
fundamentally unfair, and was therefore structural error.186 
In State v. Momah, however, the trial court, without benefit of a Bone-
Club inquiry, conducted closed-door questioning of prospective jurors to 
prevent tainting the jury pool in a notorious sex crime case.187 Yet the 
Court held this error was not structural: “not all courtroom closure errors 
are fundamentally unfair and thus not all are structural errors.”188 The 
Momah court listed several criteria for distinguishing between public 
trial errors that are structural and those that are not: 
(1) [W]hether the trial court closed the courtroom based on 
interests other than the defendant’s or to safeguard the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial; (2) whether the closure impacted 
the fairness of the defendant’s proceedings; (3) whether the 
defendant was consulted or given the opportunity to object, and 
whether the defendant assented to or actively participated in the 
closure; and finally (4) whether the record suggests that the 
court considered the defendant’s right to a public trial when it 
closed the courtroom.189 
Momah appears unique. Not only did the Court hold the error not 
structural, but it did so by examining the record and deciding for itself 
that the closure did not affect the fairness of the trial (and so did not 
                                                     
181. 128 Wash. 2d 254, 906 P.2d 325 (1995) (closing courtroom for testimony of undercover 
officer). 
182. 157 Wash. 2d 167, 137 P.3d 825 (2006) (closing courtroom for plea negotiation between 
prosecutors and codefendant). 
183. 152 Wash. 2d 795, 100 P.3d 291 (2004) (closing courtroom to spectators during voir dire). 
184. 155 Wash. 2d 506, 122 P.3d 150 (2005) (closing courtroom to spectators during voir dire).  
185. 167 Wash. 2d 222, 217 P.3d 310 (2009) (closing courtroom to spectators during voir dire). 
186. See id. at 231, 217 P.3d at 316 (citing Bone-Club, Easterling, and Orange for the proposition 
that “denial of the public trial right is deemed to be a structural error and prejudice is necessarily 
presumed”); see also State v. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d 140, 150–51, 217 P.3d 321, 326–27 (2009) 
(citing Bone-Club, Easterling, Orange, and Brightman as cases where the closure errors were held 
to be structural). For a detailed discussion of Momah and Strode, decided by the Court the same 
day, see Lutzenhiser, supra note 4, at 1229–32. 
187. 167 Wash. 2d at 145–47, 217 P.3d at 323–25. 
188. Id. at 150, 217 P.3d at 326. 
189. State v. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d 29, 47, 288 P.3d 1126, 1135 (2012) (Wiggins, J., dissenting) 
(citing Momah, 167 Wash. 2d at 151–52, 217 P.3d at 326–27). 
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constitute structural error).190 In subsequent cases, however, the Court 
has undertaken no such examination of the record. Nor has it applied the 
criteria enumerated in Momah. But the Court has not overruled 
Momah.191 
Third, the Wise/Paumier rule that failure to conduct a Bone-Club 
inquiry is itself structural error is a new development. It is one thing to 
apply the structural error doctrine to a constitutional error such as an 
unjustified closure. It is another thing to apply the structural error 
doctrine to a failure to determine on the record whether the closure is 
constitutionally justified. This rule elevates the Bone-Club analysis to an 
independent constitutional right and eliminates any review of the merits 
of the closure decision whenever the Bone-Club balancing is absent. 
The court has not clearly explained why (for example) in-chambers 
questioning of selected prospective jurors, on sensitive subjects and at 
their request, falls into the class of constitutional errors that infect the 
entire trial, such as the complete denial of counsel, coerced confession, 
racial discrimination in selection of a grand jury, denial of self-
representation at trial, or defective reasonable-doubt jury instructions. It 
is therefore even more difficult to see how the failure to articulate a 
proper balancing of interests similarly infects the entire trial process, or 
deprives defendants of “basic protections” such that “no criminal 
punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.”192 
Whether the new rule has significant practical effect will depend upon 
whether closures continue to occur without a Bone-Club analysis. And in 
future cases, that will depend, at least in part, upon whether the Court 
can clearly define the scope of the public trial right. 
3.  What Is the Impact of the Experience and Logic Test? 
Under the experience prong of the test, historical practice matters. A 
survey of what Washington judges have done “at chambers” since 
                                                     
190. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d at 151–56, 217 P.3d at 326–29. 
191. The leading opinions have instead distinguished Momah as factually unique. See, e.g., State 
v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d 1, 14–15, 288 P.3d 1113, 1119–20 (2012). This approach has been 
challenged, especially by Chief Justice Madsen. See id. at 24, 288 P.3d at 1124 (Madsen, C.J., 
dissenting); State v. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d 58, 119–20, 292 P.3d 715, 745 (2012) (Madsen, C.J., 
concurring). With the exception of Momah, the Court has extended the structural error doctrine not 
only to all violations of the public trial right, but to all cases where no Bone-Club analysis was done, 
regardless of whether or not there was an actual violation of the right and whether or not actual 
prejudice resulted. See supra Part III.B. This has meant a costly train of retrials for courts, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys. For witnesses and victims, reliving the crime at a new trial is a 
high cost indeed. 
192. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1999). 
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statehood (and thus the earliest days of sections 10 and 22) reveals that 
in-chambers conferences to discuss even legal matters have long been 
seen as constitutional and within the discretion of the trial judge.193 Until 
Sublett, however, history did not appear to have a role in the analysis, 
particularly considering that chambers questioning of potential jurors is 
a practice of very long standing. The new experience and logic test calls 
for review of historical practices. Yet it seems unlikely that the Sublett 
Court’s adoption of the test signals a shift in the voir dire cases. What 
then is the role of the history inquiry? 
a.  What Is the Breadth of the Sublett Rule? 
The Sublett chambers conference involved a deliberating jury’s 
question about its instructions on the law. The Court’s analysis was 
specific to that situation. Does the Sublett rule permit chambers 
consideration of all questions from a deliberating jury, such as questions 
about evidence, or is it limited to questions about the court’s 
instructions? What analytical path is to be used for a different sort of 
question? What if the court and counsel all have new trials underway 
and cannot be physically present where the jury is deliberating—can 
they resolve the issue on the telephone, which has been a frequent 
practice? By email? What about consideration of questions from the jury 
during trial? If jurors are permitted to submit proposed questions for 
witnesses, may counsel and the court confer in chambers to decide 
which questions should be asked? 
It was important to the Sublett Court’s analysis that a court rule 
directed the process and protected the record. The Court viewed the rule 
as serving to advance and protect the constitutional requirements of open 
courts. It will likely be a rare case in which a rule applies to protect 
section 22 interests. What is the importance of the rule in the analysis? 
b.  What About Chambers and Sidebar Conferences? 
Chambers conferences have long been used to resolve procedural 
(and sometimes substantive) issues, because they are efficient and 
productive. The defendant is normally not present. Do such conferences 
implicate a defendant’s public trial right (or the public’s right to open 
                                                     
193. See generally In re Ticeson, 159 Wash. App. 374, 384–85, 246 P.3d 550, 555–56 (2011), 
abrogated on other grounds by Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 71–72, 292 P.3d at 721–22. Ticeson was a 
matter of a Sexually Violent Predator commitment trial, and thus was a civil, not criminal 
proceeding. However, the closure questions the court discussed were similar to those at issue in the 
criminal context. Id. at 379–80, 246 P.3d at 553.  
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access)? Does the answer depend upon the nature of the discussion? 
Does it depend upon whether trial is actually underway? 
Similarly, common practice has been to address certain types of trial 
issues in a quiet sidebar conference without dismissing the jury.194 For 
example, the judge may wish to address counsel about specific lines of 
questioning or scheduling. Or counsel may wish to advise the court that 
an issue is about to surface, or reveal that a party has an urgent need for 
a recess, or state the basis for an objection. These issues may often be 
efficiently and fairly handled at sidebar; if the sidebar proves inadequate 
a recess can be taken. The alternative is to excuse the jury every time the 
judge wishes to address, question, or admonish counsel, or hear a fuller 
explanation of an objection. But this disrupts jurors’ concentration and 
leaves them frustrated by their own exclusion from the proceedings. (It 
also results in a significant loss of time, especially where jury rooms are 
not adjacent to courtrooms.) Is a sidebar closure? Does it matter what 
issue is discussed, or whether a record is made? 
c.  What Are the Limits of the Trial Judge’s Discretion? 
The Court will also have to decide where the line falls between the 
administration of a trial and the rights of the defendant and the public. 
Trial judges have the responsibility to protect the defendant’s public trial 
right.195 They also have the responsibility, and inherent and statutory196 
authority, to preserve and enforce order in the proceedings before 
them.197 Scheduling and order of witnesses; statutory or administrative 
empanelment of jurors, including general qualifications and even 
                                                     
194. Trial judges have been increasingly reluctant to conduct such conferences in light of the 
unsettled state of the law. Interview by Jeanine Blackett Lutzenhiser with the Hon. Susan 
Craighead, King County Superior Court, in Seattle, Wash. (Dec. 1, 2011); Interview by Jeanine 
Blackett Lutzenhiser with the Hon. Anne Ellington, Washington State Court of Appeals, in Seattle, 
Wash. (Dec. 29, 2011).  
195. See, e.g., In re Orange, 152 Wash. 2d 795, 805, 100 P.3d 291, 296 (2005). 
196. The Washington Revised Code provides in pertinent part:  
Every court of justice has power—(1) To preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence. 
(2) To enforce order in the proceedings before it, or before a person or body empowered to 
conduct a judicial investigation under its authority. (3) To provide for the orderly conduct of 
proceedings before it or its officers. (4) To compel obedience to its judgments, decrees, orders 
and process, and to the orders of a judge out of court, in an action, suit or proceeding pending 
therein. (5) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of 
all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter 
appertaining thereto. (6) To compel the attendance of persons to testify in an action, suit or 
proceeding therein, in the cases and manner provided by law. (7) To administer oaths in an 
action, suit or proceeding pending therein, and in all other cases where it may be necessary in 
the exercise of its powers or the performance of its duties. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 2.28.010(1)–(7) (2012). 
197. State v. Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d 85, 93–94, 257 P.3d 624, 628–29 (2011). 
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hardship not specific to a defendant’s case;198 management of space and 
accommodation; whether to permit photographers in the courtroom;199 
what security procedures are necessary200—these are matters 
traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge. Do these decisions 
implicate the public trial right or the public’s right to open access? Does 
discussion of these matters in chambers implicate those rights? The 
Court has not yet seen a case raising these issues, but its decisions thus 
far do not suggest clear lines of analysis. 
C.  Where Do the Justices Stand On These Issues? 
In light of the plethora of opinions and the recent changes in 
membership of the Court, it is useful to examine the justices’ position on 
the major issues.201 (The Court’s newest members, Justices González 
and McCloud, have not yet heard cases raising these issues.) 
1.  Scope of the Public Trial Right 
To determine when the right to public trial attaches, Justices Charles 
Johnson, Owens and James Johnson would apply the experience and 
logic test, but would recognize that the Court of Appeals’ legal/factual 
test “somewhat parallels the approach we use.”202 Chief Justice Madsen 
believes both tests are useful.203 Justices Stephens and Fairhurst would 
apply only the experience and logic test.204 Justice Wiggins rejects the 
experience and logic test as unconstitutional.205 Thus six of the justices 
will apply the experience and logic test, and four of those justices do not 
reject the legal/factual test. 
                                                     
198. See State v. Irby, 170 Wash. 2d 874, 887, 246 P.3d 796, 803 (2011) (Madsen, C.J., 
dissenting) (arguing that excusal of potential jurors for personal reasons such as general hardship is 
distinct from true voir dire when the potential jurors are introduced to the substantive legal and 
factual issues of a defendant’s case). The U.S. Supreme Court has “expressly distinguished ‘voir 
dire’ from the ‘administrative empanelment process.’” Id. at 888, 246 P.3d at 803 (citing Gomez v. 
United States, 490 U.S. 858, 874 (1989)). See also Lutzenhiser, supra note 4, at 1236–37. 
199. State v. Russell, 141 Wash. App. 733, 741, 172 P.3d 361, 364–65 (2007) (trial court 
balanced interests of defendant’s right to public trial with court’s authority to control courtroom 
photography under GR 16). 
200. State v. O’Connor, 155 Wash. App. 282, 293, 229 P.3d 880, 884 (2010). 
201. See Table 1: Open Courts Cases 2009–2012: Voting Alignments and Opinions.  
202. State v. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d 58, 72–73, 292 P.3d 715, 722 (2012). 
203. Id. at 98–99, 292 P.3d at 735 (Madsen, C.J., concurring). 
204. Id. at 136, 292 P.3d at 753 (Stephens, J., concurring). 
205. Id. at 145–50, 292 P.3d at 758–60 (Wiggins, J., concurring). 
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2.  Structural Error 
All the justices hold unjustified closure to be constitutional error. 
They are divided on the issue of structural error.206 Justices Owens, 
Fairhurst, and Stephens hold that an unjustified closure is always 
structural error and that failure to conduct a Bone-Club inquiry is itself 
structural error. Chief Justice Madsen and Justices Wiggins, Charles 
Johnson, and James Johnson do not agree. 
3.  Review and the Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Chief Justice Madsen and Justices James Johnson, Charles Johnson, 
and Wiggins would apply RAP 2.5(a)(3) to determine reviewability on 
appeal where a closure issue was not raised at trial, and Chief Justice 
Madsen would undertake an examination of the record (or an enhanced 
record) to determine whether the closure was justified. Justices Owens, 
Fairhurst, and Stephens believe application of RAP 2.5 is improper 
because it amounts to treating silence as waiver, and also reject appellate 
examination of the record to determine whether the closure was 
justified.207 Justices Wiggins, Charles Johnson, and James Johnson do 
not comment on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
In admirable understatement, Justice Chambers observed (in his brief 
concurrence in Morris) that “[t]his court’s jurisprudence regarding 
public trials under article I, sections 10 and 22 is still developing.”208 
Chief Justice Madsen made similar observations, closing her Sublett 
concurrence with a series of questions addressed to the Court as a 
whole.209 Because every criminal case may present these issues, further 
                                                     
206. See supra Part III.B. 
207. “We do not comb through the record or attempt to infer the trial court’s balancing of 
competing interests where it is not apparent in the record.” State v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d 1, 12–13, 
288 P.3d 1113, 1118 (2012). 
208. In re Morris, 176 Wash. 2d 157, 173, 288 P.3d 1140, 1148 (2012) (Chambers, J., 
concurring). 
209. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 135, 292 P.3d at 753 (Madsen, C.J., concurring) (“[M]ust we 
adhere to the harsh rule we have set up that the mere failure to make the inquiry is a constitutional 
violation of the worst kind, mandating reversal of the defendants’ convictions and reversals for new 
trials? Will we continue to disregard our own Rules of Appellate Procedure, giving them effect only 
in word, and not substance, when the public trial right cases come before us? . . . [I]t is possible to 
give all aspects of the public trial right and all aspects of our appellate rules effect. Will we do 
so?”). 
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guidance from the Supreme Court is sorely needed so as to avoid the 
dire consequences of retrials. For the sake of courts, victims, defendants, 
and public confidence, it is to be hoped the views of the justices will find 
harmony in the next round.  
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TABLE 1 continued 
Case Holding Majority/ 
Plurality 
Concur. 
1 
Concur. 
2 
Concur. 
3 
Dissent 1 Dissent 2 
Lormor 
(2011) 
 
(exclusion of 
distracting 
family 
member) 
Affirmed C. Johnson 
Alexander 
Madsen 
J. Johnson 
Chambers 
Owens 
Fairhurst 
Stephens 
Wiggins 
     
Momah 
(2009) 
 
(closed voir 
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Madsen 
Owens 
Fairhurst 
J. Johnson 
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Penoyar, 
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  Alexander 
Sanders 
Chambers 
 
 
Strode 
(2009) 
 
(closed voir 
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Reversed Alexander 
Sanders 
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  C. Johnson 
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